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Optimizing Schedules for Maritime Humanitarian
Cooperative Engagements from a United States
Navy Sea Base
Javier Salmerón, Jeffrey Kline, Greta Spitz Densham
Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943
{jsalmero@nps.edu, jekline@nps.edu, greta.densham@navy.mil}
This paper introduces Global Fleet Station Mission Planner (GFSMP), an optimization tool to aid in mission
planning and the scheduling of humanitarian assistance missions for the US Navy. GFSMP helps fleet staffs to
examine how one naval ship, which was deployed for an extended period (e.g., six months), with embarked
teams can best provide humanitarian assistance. We illustrate the application of GFSMP using notional data
from the fall 2007 Gulf of Guinea African Partnership Station demonstration, which the Commander, US Naval
Forces Europe–Commander, Sixth Fleet developed, and by its use in the Trident Warrior 2009 exercise, which the
Commander of the US Second Fleet conducted. In contrast to manual planning GFSMP’s solutions significantly
improve total mission value achieved and reduce costs. Equally important, GFSMP quickly provides decision
makers with courses of action, including partial rescheduling of existing plans, in response to exigent changes.
“Do good with what thou hast, or it will do thee no good.” William Penn, American colonial leader (1644–1718)
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ACooperative Strategy for the 21st CenturySeapower (Allen et al. 2007) elevated humanitar-
ian assistance to a core capability for the United States
Navy (USN), United States Coast Guard (USCG), and
United States Marine Corps (USMC). It encourages
forward maritime forces to establish global maritime
partnerships and to engage in humanitarian assis-
tance and crisis response, in addition to their tradi-
tional roles such as maintaining the capability to win
our nation’s wars.
The establishment of the African Partnership Station
(the “station”) by the Commander, US Naval Forces
Europe–Commander, Sixth Fleet (CNE-C6F) demon-
strated the ability of a ship to support humanitar-
ian engagements. The station consists of a ship or
ships deployed to African nations to host engage-
ment teams to conduct military training, humanitarian
efforts, and, if called upon, theater security operations.
Henceforth, we refer to all these efforts as theater secu-
rity cooperation missions.
The station may be supported by several types
of ships with different capabilities. For example, in
early 2009 the station consisted of a large amphibious
ship, the USS Nashville, along with a smaller frigate,
the USS Robert G. Bradley. In October 2007, the dock
landing ship USS Fort McHenry departed for a six-
month deployment to the Gulf of Guinea (GoG)
(Figure 1), forming a station with the high-speed ves-
sel Swift. This station performed multiple humani-
tarian assistance missions, including delivery of sup-
plies to various clinics and schools off the coast of
Monrovia, Liberia (Navy Office of Information 2008)
and construction projects for schools in São Tomé and
Principe and Port Gentil, Gabon. As US Navy Captain
John Nowell, Commander of the African Partnership
Station, stated, “We will always make the point that
we are not here for APS just to do humanitarian assis-
tance kinds of actions. We are here to do maritime
safety and security but we have the ability to do a lot
with respect to humanitarian assistance and commu-
nity outreach. It is very good for promoting goodwill
and forming relationships” (Goyak 2008).
Scheduling activities supported from a sea base is a
complex planning problem with considerations such
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Figure 1: The map shows the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) region and original CNE-C6F’s dock ship demonstration pro-
posed route (after an e-mail from Commander Michael Fulkerson to the authors on January 26, 2007).
as ship capacity to host engagement teams, length
of deployment, logistics support for the ship and
teams, budget, mission selection tailored for specific
countries, and individual mission lengths. Currently,
because most of this planning is done manually, it
requires extensive effort and constant adjustments
when new missions are added to a proposed deploy-
ment or when an exigency occurs that necessitates
rescheduling. CNE-C6F’s deployment problem for the
station is particularly demanding in the GoG region,
where long distances stress logistics capabilities, and
multiple and varying engagement mission teams are
needed in various countries.
This paper presents the Global Fleet Station Mis-
sion Planner (GFSMP), an optimization tool to aid
in mission planning and scheduling. GFSMP is a
prototypic planning tool that allows fleet staffs to
examine the feasibility of future deployments and
activities. The GFSMP model identifies how one naval
ship with embarked teams can best meet the logistical
requirements necessary to provide training and sup-
port in an area of responsibility such as the GoG. It
suggests solutions, i.e., a deployment schedule and a
combination of teams required to perform the mis-
sions, to guide planners in optimally using the naval
resources available in the region, and it provides
insights for future planning.
GFSMP is applicable in all theaters using afloat bas-
ing (i.e., naval platforms that form a sea base of oper-
ations) to support engagement teams; for example,
planners can use it to consider many scenario-specific
constraints and thus to understand how different ship
types may be used to accomplish similar missions.
Changing deployment time, team availability, bud-
get, and other data allows planners to understand
where trade-offs can be made. GFSMP simultane-
ously allocates training teams to a ship and sched-
ules its voyage and the missions’ execution to achieve
maximum theater security cooperation. This achieve-
ment is assessed as the aggregate value of missions
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carried out during the planning horizon, where each
mission’s value represents an informed, numerical
specification of its contribution to theater security
cooperation should the mission be performed.
To evaluate GFSMP and illustrate its application,
we use notional data from the fall 2007 GoG African
Partnership Station demonstration, which the CNE-
C6F GoG regional planning team developed and the
Commander, US Second Fleet (C2F) used during its
Trident Warrior 2009 exercise.
Relationship to Other Routing and
Scheduling Models
Ship routing and scheduling have been the subjects
of multiple scholarly articles since Dantzig and
Fulkerson (1954) introduced their elegant tanker
scheduling problem in which a shipping company
requires a fleet of ships of minimum size to meet ser-
vice requirements among six ports. The authors con-
vert this apparently complex problem into a standard
transportation-problem formulation for which there
are well-known, specialized solution methods.
Christiansen et al. (2004) present a comprehen-
sive review of recent literature on ship routing and
scheduling. They also discuss models at the strategic
level, such as fleet and sea-network planning, which
usually overlook the tactical or operational details
present in such planning.
Although military applications involving sea rout-
ing and scheduling abound, few are formally doc-
umented in the literature; humanitarian assistance
applications are rarely documented partly because
most USN humanitarian missions use little for-
mal routing and scheduling. Ward (2008), based on
his experience aboard the US hospital ship Comfort
during its humanitarian deployment to Latin America
and the Caribbean (The White House 2007), describes
how medical teams and other personnel may benefit
from optimized ship-to-shore transportation schedul-
ing using the ship’s helicopters, watercraft (both
owned and rented), and ground transportation pro-
vided by the host nation. Ward (2008, p. 58) also high-
lights the potential for improving operations for the
ashore mission sites “which are dynamic, unique, and
involve queuing and optimization issues, and defi-
nition and inventory management of a customized
allowance list of pharmaceuticals,” and strategic deci-
sions “involving the selection of countries and dura-
tion of stay    [and] modeling of the personnel
assignment    with consideration of the possibly
unique mix of skills required.” The latter is a design
component present in GFSMP, where the ship’s con-
figuration (composition of teams) is optimized along
with other operational decisions.
The lack of operations research analysis in US
Navy humanitarian assistance operations is apparent
from our interviews with CNE-C6F’s regional plan-
ning team leader, Commander Michael Fulkerson. In
a conference with the authors on October 19, 2006,
he reported that current naval presence in the GoG
can be adequately supported for a limited time, but
extended deployments over several months “prove
problematic.” Operational planners usually recom-
mend an initial proposal that follows the comman-
der’s intent for the overall mission. Then, logisticians
(e.g., supply officers) analyze the proposal’s feasibil-
ity and recommend adjustments to the planners until
both groups reach a consensus in terms of both opera-
tional goals and logistic requirements. Currently, how-
ever, the planning for these missions and associated
ship schedules is being carried out “the best that we
[planners] can, but without the support of any formal
operations research analysis,” according to Fulkerson.
Like GFSMP, many navy scheduling applications
perform certain tasks to maximize their effective-
ness. Brown et al. (1990) discuss the employment
schedule (involvement in major operations, exercises,
maintenance, etc.) of a fleet of military ships, guar-
anteeing a high level of combat readiness. Nulty
and Ratliff (1991) formulate a large-scale integer pro-
gram to model the deployment of a fleet of ships,
where the primary goal is to satisfy the largest pos-
sible number of requirements. Darby-Dowman et al.
(1995) and Brown et al. (1996) pursue the same goal
for the schedule of a fleet of US Coast Guard cut-
ters. Unmet requirements are penalized, establishing
a trade-off between the requirement’s importance and
the resources it consumes. Cline et al. (1992) use the
solution of a travelling salesman problem to develop
a fast, good-quality heuristic solution for the problem
of routing and scheduling Coast Guard buoy tenders.
Psaraftis et al. (1985) study the problem of assign-
ing cargoes to available navy (i.e., Military Sealift
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Command) ships in an emergency so that they can
reach their destinations within prescribed time lim-
its. Brown and Carlyle (2008) model the routing
and scheduling of a logistics force (i.e., a fleet of
30 auxiliary ships carrying fuel, ammunition, dry
cargo, and food) in support of US Navy combat-
ant groups worldwide. Salmerón et al. (2009) use
stochastic optimization to discuss the timely delivery
of cargo in a hostile environment that could disrupt
port availability.
Most routing and scheduling problems at the oper-
ational level fall in the broad category of the well-
known vehicle routing problem (VRP), which entails
designing the optimal set of routes for a fleet of vehi-
cles and the vehicles’ schedules to serve a given set
of customers. The interest in this type of problem is
motivated by its practical relevance and by its con-
siderable difficulty (Toth and Vigo 2002). GFSMP has
requirements not typically found in a standard VRP.
For example, it determines an optimal ship–team con-
figuration; it then allows any team to be dropped off
at a location for the duration of its mission and be
recovered again later when the mission is complete,
allowing the ship to carry out other missions in other
ports in the meantime.
Problem Details and Modeling Assumptions
GFSMP posits a navy vessel that is equipped with
teams to carry out theater security cooperation mis-
sions in its area of responsibility during a planning
horizon. Its primary objective is to devise both an opti-
mal route and mission schedule that maximizes the
total mission value earned. The simultaneous opti-
mization is the key complication here for planners.
Because the total port visit fees incurred while con-
ducting the missions can be substantial, GFSMP’s sec-
ondary objective is to minimize these fees. We use the
term country and port interchangeably to refer to loca-
tions where the ship may conduct missions and (or)
obtain fuel or provisions (e.g., food and replacement
parts). One or several fictitious at-sea ports represent
locations where the ship may, for example, conduct
multicountry training missions or exploit opportuni-
ties to schedule replenishments (fuel or commodities)
at select times when supply ships are in the area.
While underway, the ship must stay at or above
its minimum fuel level and maintain sufficient provi-
sions for all its personnel. We plan for a fixed amount
of provisions to be consumed every day per person.
However, the amount of fuel consumed depends on
the ship’s activity; three burn rates may be selected:
underway (i.e., at a nominal transit speed), at anchor,
and moored pier-side. Travel days between any pair
of ports are precalculated based on feasible sea
routes and the vessel’s nominal transit speed. The
ship incurs a port-dependent charge for each day it
remains in port.
For each mission–country pair, we assume that
adequate support, transportation, and (or) training
facilities to conduct the mission have been verified.
In addition, we assume that the team resources and
physical requirements needed to conduct the missions,
including storage space, communications, etc., can be
met by the ship or host nation. Teams are self-sufficient
while conducting their missions ashore; i.e., the ship
does not have to remain in port unless the mission is
specifically so restricted. In addition, some missions
may require the ship to be moored pier-side (e.g., to
load or unload heavy equipment) during the first and
last days of the mission, whereas other missions may
allow the ship to remain at anchor.
Every candidate mission in each country has a pre-
determined value (the higher the better), a cost, and
a fixed duration, and it can be completed by one of
several potential teams. Some missions have a prece-
dence requirement; i.e., a mission may require one or
more other missions to be completed before it can be
carried out. Each mission requires the ship to deliver
a qualified team to the respective country to com-
plete the mission and to recover the team immediately
upon the mission’s completion. Each team may have
the capability to complete several missions, but only
one at a time.
Each type of team has limited availability and
a specified number of personnel; in addition, the
amount of berthing space to provide for all per-
sonnel of all teams assigned to the ship is limited.
Thus, in addition to selecting the optimal routing and
scheduling, GFSMP must determine the deployment’s
optimal team configuration.
We present the optimization model used to solve
this problem in the appendix. In the next section, we
describe the planning scenarios we used with that
model.
Salmerón, Kline, and Densham: Optimizing Schedules for Maritime Humanitarian Cooperative Engagements
242 Interfaces 41(3), pp. 238–253, © 2011 INFORMS
Description of Resources and
Constraints
Overview of Scenarios
The baseline scenario is based on a 2007 GoG demon-
stration developed by the CNE-C6F GoG regional
planning team, which assumes a dock landing ship
(dock ship—LSD in Table 1) as the station during a
six-month planning horizon and Rota, Spain as the
origin and destination port. The available budget of
$10 million must cover all mission and port costs in
all countries.
The C2F subsequently adopted the baseline sce-
nario for the Trident Warrior 2009 exercise, replac-
ing the Dock ship with the amphibious assault ship
USS Kearsarge (Amphib—LHD in Table 1). The plan-
ning horizon for the exercise is April 10, 2009 (day 1)
through October 6, 2009 (day 180). The exercise also
adds new missions and logistic requirements as well
as surprise exigencies, e.g., a ship suffering a propul-
sion casualty and a replacement of the Amphib large
deck by a high-speed vessel ship (Speed—HSV in
Table 1).
Ship and Team Characteristics
Table 1 displays the ship characteristics we used in
our scenarios. We observe that Amphib has a fuel
capacity of approximately 43,000 barrels (bbls)—42
gallons—of marine diesel fuel. To mitigate the risk of
poor weather or other unforeseen circumstances, such
as a sudden mission reassignment, naval regional
commanders can establish minimum fuel levels at any
time. For Amphib, we set this level at 60 percent of its
capacity. This level also helps maintain the best sta-
bility because under certain levels the ship’s rolling
Fuel consumption
Resupply Underway (bbls/day) underway Fuel capacity (bbls)
Ship Beds time (days) speed (knots) at anchor docked (min. level)
LSD
Dock ship 414 25 12 277 69 69 13045 (60%)
LHD
Amphibious ship 1670 25 14 1071 214 214 43091 (60%)
HSV
Speed ship 142 10 20 400 100 0 3700 (20%)
Table 1: Ship characteristics, as assumed in GFSMP scenarios, are shown for Dock, Amphibious (Amphib), and
Speed ships.
Available Size
Team (No. of teams) (persons/team)
Coast Guard Detachment (USCG) 2 4
Navy Warfare Command Component
(NWC) 4 25
Explosive Ordnance Detachment (EOD) 3 12
Naval Construction Force (NCF) 4 13
Maritime Civil Affairs Group (MCAG) 2 6
Expeditionary Training Command (ETC) 4 4
Maritime Expeditionary Security Force
(MESF) 4 24
Medical Support (EXMED) 2 5
Other Reserve Unit (RES) 2 4
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) 2 4
Ship Crew (CREW) 3 1
Marines 1 150
Table 2: The number available and size are shown for GFSMP teams.
motion becomes problematic and may reduce overall
performance. Given that underway consumption at
14 knots is 1,071 bbls per day, Amphib’s endurance is
approximately 16 days while in transit. Burn rates at
anchor and at dock are estimated at 214 bbls per day
for auxiliary steaming. In addition, this station must
obtain general supplies at least every 25 days.
Table 2 describes the available teams, the maximum
number of teams available at any one time, and the
size (i.e., number of personnel) of each team; it also
defines abbreviated team names for later reference.
All team sizes reflect the various teams predicted by
the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, except
for the ship crew (CREW) team. CREW describes any
number of personnel assigned to the ship (rather than
ashore) to carry out an onboard mission. These mis-
sions often include military-to-military training, which
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subject matter experts or senior enlisted personnel
usually conduct, or community relations projects.
Larger numbers of personnel contribute to the com-
munity relations projects or preplanned humanitar-
ian assistance missions with the communities ashore.
GFSMP currently limits the simultaneous number of
these missions to three at any given time. For the
smaller ships, e.g., Speed or Dock ships, this is a
realistic number. Planners can adjust this number to
suit requests by the host nations.
Mission Data
Table 3 describes the initial set of countries, missions,
and mission–country demand pairs. Missions can be
classified into several categories (e.g., medical, infras-
tructure) with the following attributes: duration, cost,
mission value (i.e., theater security cooperation (TSC)
value), and mission-capable team types. Countries
have associated daily port costs. Some ports can refuel
and (or) resupply the station ship. The at-sea port
represents a location off the coast of Nigeria, approx-
imately 175 nautical miles south of Lagos. Norfolk,
Virginia is the origin and return port for the station.
The missions are a subset of those designated by
CNE-C6F’s long-term plan to be carried out between
2007 and 2016. Although the mission values shown
are estimates based on information from previous-
mission feedback, they are ultimately subjective. The
total mission value for the 66 mission–country pairs
is 377. Individual values range from one point for
band lessons, which several countries require, to 30
points for the 21-day “theater security task force” mis-
sion in Nigeria, involving a 150-person marine team.
This mission is the only one with a required start-
ing date on planning day 62 (June 10). Some missions
are in-port missions. For example, community rela-
tions requires the station to remain in-port while the
mission is conducted. Mission-duration estimates are
based on experience in previous deployments.
Distances between ports are calculated using direct,
port-to-port, great-circle routes (if navigable), or
shortest-path distances through sea-way points to
avoid land. At a constant speed of 14 knots, Amphib
needs approximately 10 days to travel from its home
port of Norfolk to Dakar, Senegal, in West Africa. This
port is only a refueling and resupply port in our base-
line scenario. Distances between ports with assigned
missions range from 0.18 days to travel from Port
Gentil, Gabon to São Tomé, São Tomé, and Principe
(a nation later referred to as STP) to 4.95 days to
travel from Buchanan, Liberia, to Luanda, Angola.
We use GFSMP with daily time fidelity, so we have
adopted the convention that all travel times exceed-
ing one-tenth of a day will be rounded up to a full
day. For example, 6.08 days of travel from Senegal
to Cameroon are treated as 6.00 days in GFSMP, and
5.13 days from Senegal to Nigeria are conservatively
rounded up to 6.00 days.
The countries listed in Table 3 can provide both fuel
and supplies. However, countries can sometimes pro-
vide one but not the other.
The 1,670 beds for teams on Amphib exceed the
space needed. However, bed space is more restrictive
on other ships. GFSMP favors fewer teams on board
when possible, i.e., in the presence of multiple optima.
Results
CNE-C6F Demonstration
First, we evaluate a preliminary version of GFSMP
to confirm the feasibility of carrying out all possible
missions during a six-month deployment, following
the manual schedule (Figure 1) created by CNE-C6F
planners; it assumes the Dock ship for the 2007 sta-
tion and Rota, Spain as the Dock ship’s origin and
destination. Numbered ports indicate the sequence of
stops provided by CNE-C6F planners.
For this scenario, GFSMP shows that the maxi-
mum mission value can be accomplished in only five
months and at a lower cost.
In addition, we conducted excursions to assess
trade-offs; for example, we found the following:
(1) Reducing the total mission value by 10 percent
reduces costs by 27 percent;
(2) within a reduced mission time of only three
months, we can still achieve 85 percent of the total
mission value; and
(3) replacing the Dock ship with the smaller, faster,
but less fuel-efficient Speed results in significant cost
savings. This is partly because of reduced in-port
costs as well as Speed’s fast-transit capability between
ports; this allows it to drop off teams ashore and
leave for another port more frequently than the Dock
ship can. On the downside, reduced bed space may
become problematic for a larger mission set.
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Spitz (2007) gives details for the CNE-C6F
demonstration.
C2F Trident Warrior Exercise: Baseline Scenario
The first phase of the Trident Warrior 2009 exercise
uses the data described in the previous section and
Amphib as the station. Despite the addition of a costly
and lengthy mission in Nigeria and the longer dis-
tance from Norfolk, GFSMP schedules all missions
during the 180-day horizon, achieving all 377 mission
points and spending less than the $10 million budget.
Figure 2 shows a snapshot of the recommended
schedule for a subset of planning days covering one
month of the deployment. The two top rows represent
the calendar and deployment days, respectively. The
row labeled “Country” indicates the country where
the ship is in-port; blue indicates that the ship is
underway.
The chart shows GFSMP’s flexibility for accom-
modating multiple concurrent missions. Specifically,
the station comes from recovering three teams in
Cameroon, where it left four other teams ashore and
then sailed for Nigeria. It drops off the marines for
Month
Day 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(Deployment day) 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
Country Cameroon Nigeria Cameroon Gabon Nigeria At Sea
(fuel or supplies) X X* X X
Infr. gap analysis << NCF
Comm. MTT << ETC

















Figure 2: The GFSMP schedule for planning days 58–89 of 1–180 is displayed. Multiple missions are planned
around the three-week duration of the mandatory theater security task force mission carried out by a marine
team.
their theater security task force mission on planning
day 62 and returns to Cameroon to recover the four
teams who have just completed their missions. While
the theater security task force mission is still ongoing,
several other missions take place in Gabon; the sta-
tion then sails back to Nigeria to recover the marines
upon completion of their mission. The subsequent set
of missions is at sea and requires the station to remain
at the at-sea location.
The team composition of the station consists of 252
personnel, divided as follows (an asterisk indicates
that the maximum number of teams available is used;
team codes are listed in Table 2): two USCG∗, one
EOD, four NCF∗, one MCAG, one ETC, one EXMED,
two RES∗, one MDA, a large Marines∗ team of 150
USMC personnel, and three CREW* teams.
C2F Trident Warrior Exercise:
Underway Replenishment
The “X” marks in Figure 2 indicate refueling and
resupply opportunities over time. Although GFSMP
produces a self-sustained schedule for the station
ship by just taking fuel and supplies from designated
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ports, navy planners typically ensure that a station
ship deployed for an extended period will receive
support by the combat logistic force (CLF). Thus, tak-
ing GFSMP’s schedule as an input, we use a CLF
planner (Brown and Carlyle 2008) to schedule an
underway replenishment date and location schedule.
The CLF planner recommends this on day 72 (indi-
cated by an “X∗” mark), shortly before the station
arrives at Gabon. The replenishment would allow the
station to skip the refuel and resupply port call origi-
nally planned in that country on day 79.
One exigency analyzed by planners using GFSMP
during the first phase of Trident Warrior exercise con-
sists of a casualty suffered by the CLF supply ship
on June 18, two days before its meeting with the sta-
tion. One of its engines has been damaged, reduc-
ing its speed and preventing it from carrying out
the underway replenishment of the station at the
planned date and location. The C2F planners used
GFSMP to produce several possible responses to this
exigency and presented these to the fleet commander
for consideration.
Examples of these courses of actions (in brief)
include the following.
(1) Primacy of theater logistics: The supply ship is
positioned for the most expeditious repairs and cen-
tral theater position, the underway replenishment is
cancelled, and the supply ship returns to either the
port of Dakar, Senegal or the port of Rota, Spain for
repair. The station obtains fuel and supplies in Gabon
as in the baseline scenario.
(2) Primacy of station mission: The supply ship
continues at the lower speed to meet the station at the
initial location but at a later time. This is still feasible
given the current location of the supply ship, the new
meeting time on day 80 (June 28), and CLF planner
verification that the supply ship’s later return to the
Mediterranean would not adversely impact overall
CLF requirements elsewhere. This option causes no
impact on the station schedule but requires the sup-
ply ship to travel further east into the GoG with a
damaged engine.
(3) Compromises between CLF and station mis-
sions: These compromises include several possible
courses of action in which the station travels to new
meeting locations on certain dates saving the sup-
ply ship from traveling to Gabon. This may have an
impact on the station schedule, requiring some mis-
sions to be advanced or postponed to maintain the
mission’s value.
The fleet commander must ultimately decide the
best course of action that serves the joint interest of
the station mission and the navy. GFSMP ensures the
best solution for the new exigency, according to the
commander’s intent. The revised plan also adheres to
a “persistence” specification made by the comman-
der that missions carried out at the at-sea location
starting July 2 had to remain within the prescheduled
time windows because of their multinational char-
acter. The concept of optimization with persistence
(Brown et al. 1997) is used, for example, in the recent
work by Fagerholt et al. (2009), who reschedule and
reroute ships ensuring that, given the new informa-
tion available, their solutions are near optimal and
close to a prespecified baseline plan. In GFSMP, we do
not implement persistence based on relative penalties
for deviations with respect to a baseline plan. How-
ever, we implement persistence for port calls and mis-
sion execution as requested by the commander, as in
the above example.
C2F Trident Warrior Exercise: Amphib
Loitering at Anomie Oil Platform
The second phase of the Trident Warrior exercise
hypothesizes three scenarios requiring the station to
remain loitering in the vicinity of the Anomie Oil
Platform (Anomie-OPLAT) off the coast of Nige-
ria to engage in a special anti-piracy and security
mission.
Scenarios 1 and 2: Amphib continues with its mis-
sions after Anomie-OPLAT.
Two scenarios assume that on day 73 (June 21)
the large-deck Amphib receives orders to interrupt
its current visit to Gabon so it may begin its new
mission at Anomie-OPLAT on day 77 (June 25). The
duration of this mission is 31 days for Scenario 1 and
45 days for Scenario 2. We assume that CLF support
for fuel and supplies can be provided to Amphib dur-
ing those days and that it will be released to continue
its deployment after that period.
Several missions in Gabon must be cancelled to
allow Amphib to recover the last team on day 75 and
sail for Anomie-OPLAT in time. The scenarios also
assume the marine team currently in Lagos, Nigeria,
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with an ongoing theater security task force mission,
will be flown by helicopters to Amphib upon com-
pletion of its mission, which is scheduled to finish on
day 82.
Because of its exclusive dedication to the Anomie-
OPLAT mission, a disruption to the incumbent sched-
ule is inevitable. To assess the loss in mission value,
we must again plan for the remaining days of the
schedule in each scenario. Planning personnel may be
tempted to use the schedule in place as the basis for
such a reassessment. For example, one may assume
that missions scheduled for the blocked days are sim-
ply forfeited. Skipping such missions has the advan-
tage that the rest of the schedule is unchanged after
the station is released. However, if some are high-
value missions, planners may need to seek other
alternatives.
Another strategy could be shifting the scheduled
missions. Amphib would continue with the same
mission sequence as in the original schedule, from
the point where it left before the Anomie-OPLAT
requirement. Of course, the station must still return
to its home port by day 180; therefore, the last mis-
sions in the original schedule would be skipped.
Although these back-of-the-envelope alternatives may
sound appealing to planners, who are under great
time pressure as the new requirements unfold, they
may produce suboptimal solutions, as we show using
counterexamples.
Instead, we use GSFMP to reschedule the sta-
tion after it has been released from its duties at
Anomie-OPLAT for the remaining days in the plan-
ning horizon. As in the first phase of the Trident
Warrior exercise, the commander could impose any
additional conditions to limit the flexibility of the new
schedule. However, we were directed to perform a
comparison assuming no other restrictions.
The comparative results of the three strategies fol-
low. To put these numbers in perspective, although
the maximum mission value achievable over 180 days
is 377 points, by planning day 77 only 137 points
are pending to be collected. Thus, for each scenario
and strategy, we indicate the absolute mission value
lost, the percentage with respect to the 137 max-
imum, and the number of missions cancelled by
country.
Scenario 1. Thirty-one days blocked (planning days
77–107):
—Skipping: 72 points (53 percent). All missions in
Angola, at-sea, and Gabon, and one in STP.
—Shifting: 43 points (31 percent). Three missions
in Liberia, two in Ghana, two in STP, and one in
Gabon.
—GFSMP: 23 points (17 percent). Two missions in
Ghana, two in STP, and one in Angola.
Scenario 2. Forty-five days blocked (planning days
77–122):
—Skipping: 87 points (64 percent). Same as in Sce-
nario 1, and four more missions in Liberia.
—Shifting: 64 points (47 percent). Same as in Sce-
nario 1, and all missions in Liberia.
—GFSMP: 39 points (28 percent). All missions in
Angola, two in Ghana, and one in Liberia.
As we can see in both scenarios, GFSMP achieves
significant improvements over back-of-the-envelope
strategies.
Figure 3 shows the chart for the scenario with
45 days blocked. The chart starts on day 124 (August
20) when the ship reengages in conducting missions.
We observe that there are multiple simultaneous mis-
sions in Gabon, STP and the at-sea locations. A 10-day,
non-in-port, ashore mission is scheduled in Gabon
between days 140 and 149, allowing us to use the
intermediate days to carry out several missions that
require the station to remain at the at-sea location.
We also notice the optimized use of naval construc-
tion force teams to perform multiple missions simul-
taneously in different countries; they never exceed the
four embarked teams at any given time. For example,
during the first visit to Gabon, the road improvement
mission must wait until day 131 to begin because all
four naval construction force teams are engaged in two
other missions in Gabon and two in STP.
Scenario 3. Speed replaces Amphib to provide mis-
sion value.
In the third scenario, Amphib receives notice on
planning day 74 (June 22) that it will need to rejoin
its combatant group at sea by the end of July 8
(day 90). Planners decide to allow Speed to assume
the station for the remaining days. That is, a subset
of the current teams currently embarked on Amphib
will be transferred to Speed. Specifically, Speed is
expected to take aboard the teams on July 10 (day
Salmerón, Kline, and Densham: Optimizing Schedules for Maritime Humanitarian Cooperative Engagements
248 Interfaces 41(3), pp. 238–253, © 2011 INFORMS
Month
Day 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(Deployment day) 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153
Country STP Gabon STP Gabon At-Sea Gabon → To Liberia















Figure 3: The chart displays GFSMP rescheduling for planning days 124–153 of 1–180 after Amphib is required
to remain at sea during days 77–122.
92) at the at-sea location and will employ them
until September 21 (day 165), when they should be
returned to Amphib at the same location. This should
give Amphib enough time to return to its home port
in Norfolk by planning day 180 with all of its crew
and teams.
We make certain assumptions for Speed (Table 1).
For example, we assume a nominal speed of 20 knots.
Although Speed can travel much faster, this capabil-
ity is weather-dependent and incurs much higher fuel
consumption that is not routinely approved by the
navy; this also implies less endurance and more fre-
quent refueling needs in an area of operation where
fuel availability is limited. The required resupply
duration of 10 days is also an important limitation
compared to the endurance of either the Dock or
Amphib ships.
We also assume that Speed has 142 beds available
(97 permanent plus 75 temporary, minus 40 for its
crew). Because the teams embarked on Amphib total
252 people, we limit the transfer of personnel accord-
ing to the current Amphib configuration of teams.
Other data for Speed include, for example, port
costs with respect to those displayed in Table 3
for Amphib. The updated costs range approximately
from 10 percent lower in Douala and Dakar to 35 per-
cent lower in Luanda, Port Gentil, and Buchanan.
Given that there is sufficient time between the noti-
fication and the station transfer days, planners also
consider adding new missions to the schedule to take
advantage of the speed of Speed. Also, to have more
flexibility to add demand requirements involving the
large Marines team, this is split into five Marines
groups (see Table 4), which can now engage in differ-
ent missions independently.
The requirements for this scenario add 29 mission–
country pairs as follows: 3 in Dakar, 13 in Lagos, 8 in
Cotonou, Benin, and 5 in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. The
purple stars in Figure 1 indicate ports that have new
missions added. The new missions add 158 points
to the original value of 377, making a maximum of
535 points possible. At the team hand-off date (day
92), Amphib has already mustered 283 points, leav-
ing 252 as the maximum that Speed can achieve. The
GFSMP solution achieves 212 points (84 percent of
the possible points) between days 92 and 165, for a
Mission Duration Cost Capable
Mission value (days) ($) teams (size)
Theater security task 30 21 400000 Marines (150)
force (TSTF)—Original
Theater security task 8 21 366000 Marines-1 (120)
force—New
Marine leadership—New 5 3 1500 Marines-2 (2)
Marine ground security 7 5 10000 Marines-3 (13)
training—New
Marine HA/DR—New 5 10 15000 Marines-4 (5)
Marine reconnaissance—New 5 5 7500 Marines-5 (5)
Table 4: We show how the original theater security task force mission and
marine team used in Scenarios 1 and 2 are broken down for Speed replan-
ning in Scenario 3. HA/DR, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.
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Month
Day 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
(Deployment day) 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128
Country Nigeria Benin Nigeria Ghana Nigeria Liberia Ghana Ivory Co Libe
(fuel or supplies) X X X
Marine HA/DR << Marines-4
Infectious diseases MED




Small boat maint. ETC
MDA site survey MDA










AIS receive sites NCF
Medical ops. RES >>
Maritime partner. USCG >>
Port security NCF >>
July August
Figure 4: The chart displays GFSMP rescheduling for planning days 99–128 of 1–180 after Amphib is required to
remain at sea starting on day 90 and Speed takes over starting on day 92.
combined total of 495 points. During this short period,
Speed makes a total of 21 trips. Figure 4 shows the
schedule details for days 99 to 128. All countries
are visited except Cameroon, where all missions had
already been performed, and Senegal.
Conclusions
GFSMP is a mission-planning and scheduling opti-
mization tool designed to provide fleet staffs with
the ability to examine the feasibility of future deploy-
ments and activities in support of the Global Fleet
Station concept. In this paper, we have illustrated its
application to exercises developed by the Comman-
der of CNE-C6F and the C2F for humanitarian and
other theater security cooperation missions in GoG.
GFSMP can be used for long-term planning and
sudden exigencies requiring rescheduling. We have
demonstrated significant improvements over manual
planning in total mission value achieved and costs.
After its initial demonstration and use by CNE-C6F
staff, GFSMP was selected by Navy Warfare Devel-
opment Command and C2F staff to be used in the
US Navy’s 2009 Trident Warrior series of exercises for
planning and further evaluation as a potential tool for
fleet-wide use. This exercise was mainly devoted to
maximizing the effectiveness of humanitarian assis-
tance to African nations bordering GoG. Schedule
outputs from GFSMP have been used inside this exer-
cise series by the C2F to meet emerging demands
from the GoG.
GFSMP is applicable in all theaters using afloat bas-
ing to support engagement teams. However, it is not
intended to be a stand-alone decision aid. Instead, as
it continues to be used by navy staffs and modified
with their suggestions, the longer-range intent is for
it to be integrated into a suite of decisions aids sup-
porting maritime planning staffs.
Appendix
This appendix describes GFSMP’s basic model
formulation.
Indices and Sets
T : time periods (days), t ∈ T = 12     T .
C: countries, including “at-sea” predesignated
locations, c ∈C; c0 is the home port.
M : missions, m ∈M .
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U : team types, u ∈U .
CF CP ⊂C: subset of countries that can provide
fuel and provisions, respectively.
MW ⊂M : subset of in-port missions.
B⊂M ×M : subset of (mm′ pairs where mission
m must precede mission m′.
J ⊂M ×U : subset mu pairs where mission m
can be carried out by team type u.
K ⊂M ×C: subset of mc pairs where mission m
is solicited by country c.
Parameters and Units (units are in parentheses)
r : number of beds available for all team personnel
(persons).
pu: number of people in each team of type u (per-
sons per team).
nu n¯u: minimum and maximum number of teams
of type u onboard the ship (teams).
dm: duration of mission m (whole days).
sc c′ : duration of trip from country c to country c′
(whole days).
f 0 f  f¯ : initial, minimum, and maximum fuel
onboard, respectively (bbls).
bQ bW : fuel burn rate when underway and waiting
in port, respectively (bbls per day).
p: maximum time between ship resupply for pro-
visions (days).
vm: mission value earned for accomplishing mis-
sion m (mission-value units).
gMm : cost of mission m ($).
gCc : in-port cost at country c ($ per day).
b: budget allocated for all missions and port
costs ($).
	1	2: small penalties to discourage unnecessary
use of ports when a cost is incurred, unnecessary tran-
sits, and unnecessary use of teams, respectively (set
to 	1	2 = 001 in all our runs).
Decision Variables and Units (units, if applicable,
are in parentheses)
Xmc tu: 1 if mission m in country c starts in day t
by team u, 0 otherwise.
Wct : 1 if the ship is waiting in port at country c in
day t, 0 otherwise.
Qcc′ t : 1 if the ship starts a trip from country c to
country c′ in day t, 0 otherwise.
Ft : amount of fuel onboard the ship at the end of
day t (bbls).
Et : amount of fuel supplied to the ship at the begin-
ning of day t (bbls).
Nu: number of teams of type u onboard the ship
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∑
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bQQcc′ t′ ∀ t (12)
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Wc0 t = 1 ∀ t ∈ 1 T  (13)
Qcc′t = 0 ∀ t ∈ 1 T  (14)
Xmc tuQcc′ tWc t ∈ 01
∀mc c′ tu  mc ∈K mu ∈ J  (15)
nu ≤Nu ≤ n¯u and integer ∀u (16)
Et ≥ 0 ∀ t (17)
f ≤ Ft ≤ f¯ ∀ t (18)
Formulation Description. The first term in the
objective function (1) maximizes the total mission
value from all missions accomplished. The second
term discourages incurring any unnecessary port
costs. The in-port penalty can be left as a constant or
be replaced by a function of the actual in-port cost,
gCc ; in this case, we would be creating a trade-off
between the port cost and the mission value it gener-
ates. The third and fourth terms discourage solutions
in which the ship transits unnecessarily or brings
onboard more teams than needed, respectively.
Equations (2) and (3) represent knapsack-like con-
straints for berthing space and budget, respectively.
Equation (4) is a balance equation for the ship’s loca-
tion. The left side of the equation becomes one when
the ship waits at port c in period t, or when the ship is
underway to c with arrival date t. Only when either of
these conditions is met can the ship wait at or depart c
during the next period, t+ 1.
Equations (5) and (6) ensure that each team is
dropped off on the day it starts performing the mis-
sion and is picked up immediately after completion.
Equation (7) enforces the ship to remain in-port dur-
ing the entire execution for missions so designated.
Equation (8) restricts each team to accomplish-
ing only one mission simultaneously; Equation (9)
provides mission precedence between associated
missions.
Equations (10)–(12) account for replenishment
needs. Equation (10) ensures that the ship obtains pro-
visions and other supplies within no more than p
days apart at ports that can provide these commodi-
ties, Equation (11) ensures that fuel is obtained from
allowed ports and only if the ship is in-port, and
Equation (12) keeps track of the fuel at time t through
all that has been used and taken on in refueling.
Equations (13) and (14) establish the initial and final
conditions, which include the ship leaving from and
returning to its home port.
Constraints (15)–(18) establish the domain for all
decision variables in the model.
The formulations described above depict the ker-
nel of the GFSMP model. Other decision variables
and constraints, which we did not list for brevity
reasons, are used to represent the following opera-
tional and logistical requirements: in-port locations
for the ship, including docked, at anchor, and at an
offshore aviation position; associated port costs and
fuel burn rates at each of these locations; fuel costs;
missions requiring the ship to offload troops and
equipment in a docked position; in-port missions that
can be sustained while the ship is at anchor and (or)
at an offshore aviation position; other aviation con-
straints; time windows for mission execution; time
windows for replenishment availability at ports or
for underway replenishment (i.e., at sea); mandatory
ports of call and dates of visit; and ongoing missions
and teams involved during replanning activities.
In addition, GFSMP incorporates other logical valid
inequalities to speed up convergence, such as avoid-
ing trivial cycle trips or eliminating impossible trips
early and late in the deployment, given the origin and
destination ports.
Model Size Details. GFSMP is a large-scale mixed-
integer program. The full 180-day problem, includ-
ing the missions, teams, network, and other data
described in this paper, has over 150,000 constraints
and 60,000 variables, of which 25,000 are binary.
We typically solve GFSMP using a rolling-horizon,
heuristic scheme (Bostel et al. 2008, p. 517) with a block
of approximately 50 days, about 43,000 constraints,
and 7,300 binary variables. CPLEX 11.2 preprocessing
reduces this to about 6,400 constraints and 5,800 bina-
ries and obtains a solution that is within 5 percent of
optimal within one hour.
After the first block, subsequent blocks start shortly
before the end of the preceding block (rather than on
the following day) to cope with possible “end effects,”
such as missions that could have started (but not be
completed) during that block. Earlier blocks are usu-
ally harder to solve because there are more missions
to complete. Overall, a complete solution for a 180-
day planning horizon using this heuristic is achieved
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within three hours, which is acceptable to planners.
For reschedules caused by exigencies while the station
is underway, solution time is significantly reduced
because the time horizon is shorter and some missions
have already been performed.
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